Showing posts with label Thucydides. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Thucydides. Show all posts

Saturday, December 23, 2006

How Democratic Was Athens? (con’t)

This, of course, is a topic that could, and has been, expanded upon to a much greater extent than I can here. However, in this post, I will explore another incident in the Peloponnesian War which brings into question the fairness of Athenian democracy. I acknowledge there is a great deal more to say on this topic, and I intend to return to it in the future.

In war, it was not abnormal for Athenian generals to be tried and punished for crimes and shortcomings in war - they were always to provide a proper burial for the dead; they were never permitted to hit a soldier. These all seem like reasonable expectations for military leaders. However, you’d expect there to be a limit. You, being the Athenian people, can’t punish someone for doing something in you best interests but that you don’t like… right?

Apparently not. As the inevitable failure of the Sicilian Expedition became increasingly apparent, Nicias, one of the greatest generals Athens ever produced and the man responsible for the earlier Peace of Nicias, refused to retreat from Sicily out of fear of the Athenian people. His fellow general, Demosthenes, openly declared that it would be best for the Athenians to retreat. Even the soldiers were “crying out so loudly about their desperate position” (Thucydides, History of the Peloponnesian War VII:48). It seems as though this would be an acceptable move. But Nicias disagreed.

The troublesome part of this story is that Nicias did not demand that the Athenians stay in Sicily because he believed it to be the best move militarily. Nor because he thought they had a better chance to win the battle. Indeed, according to Thucydides, Nicias agreed that “ their affairs were in a bad way.” He was, nevertheless, unwilling to leave. Nicias knew the Athenian people well – they would not approve of the withdrawal. He also knew what fate awaited him upon his return. “Hostile critics” would deliver speeches and reports to the Athenians “whose judgments would be swayed by any clever speech designed to create prejudice.” Even his own soldiers could not be counted on; regardless of how dire they agreed the situation was while in Sicily, they “would, as soon as they got to Athens, entirely change their tune and would say the generals had been bribed to betray them and return” (VII:48). Plutarch agrees, explaining that Nicias refused to retreat, “not because he underrated the Syracuseasn, but because he was still more afraid of the Athenian people and of the accusations and trials which would follow at home” (The Rise and Fall of Athens VII:22).

I find this to be not only disturbing but ineffective. This seems problematic to the idea of the great Athenian democracy. How fair is a government when one of its best generals is too afraid of the prejudiced condemnation of his fellow citizens to make the militaristic decisions which he believes to be best? How well run is an army when decisions are being made for any reason other than what will give the group the best chance of victory and/or survival? Nicias made a conscious decision that death at the hands of his enemy in a failed battle would be preferable to being “put to death on a disgraceful charge and by an unjust verdict of the Athenians” (VII:48). Nicias is described as “knowing the Athenian character.” If even he did not fully trust the constructs of the judicial system, I think it is safe to say that system was corrupt.

So, how fair is a system in which innocent leaders are liable to be put to death for making a unpopular but responsible decision? Not very, I would have to say.

Monday, December 18, 2006

How democratic was Athens?

Since I've known what Ancient Greece was, I've known that Athenian democracy is touted as the great predecessor of our own American democracy and of all democracies, to some extent, throughout the world. This is a fact often taken for granted in studying the ancient world. It is very easy to make comparisons between the U.S. and Athens.

However, as I am learning more about the form of democracy developed and employed at the height of Athenian power, I am become more and more suspicious that this system may not be all it is cracked up to be. There are the obvious undemocratic aspects of Athens, such as slavery and the political and social repression of women. I am willing to leave these out of the equation, given that America, too, was guilty of these same crimes for the better part of her existence.

Apart from this, however, I am finding things that make me wonder how democratic this place really was. Several instances in the Peloponnesian War are particularly questionable. Take the case of Alcibiades, for example. The night before the great (but doomed) Athenian expedition to Sicily was to launch all but one of the Hermea in the city were mutilated. The Hermea, podiums with the head of Hermes and a phallus, were located all throughout the city calling on the god for protection from evil. Such a sacrilege, particularly the night before such a crucial expedition, was seen as a very bad omen for the mission and a grave crime that had to be punished. Although it still remains uncertain who was responsible for the acts, Alcibiades was accused. (His actual guilt or innocence is irrelevant to the point I am making with this story.) According to Thucydides in his History of the Peloponnesian War, Alcibiades denied the charges but requested to stand trial before leaving for Sicily. He begged the citizens not to listen to his enemies in his absence but rather try and, if necessary, put him to death right there while he could still defend himself. He even acknowledged “how unwise it would be to send him out in command of such a large army with such serious accusations still hanging over his head” (VI: 29). This seems like a very level-headed and fair thing for a man in such a position to say. However, the Athenians, so worked up about their attack on Sicily, were willing to overlook this offense for the sack of the mission. The Athenians decided, then, it would be best not to hold up the army. Alcibiades would sail with them and return in a set number of days to stand trial.

Does this sound very democratic to you? Because of his position of military and social prominence, Alcibiades was allowed to avoid trial. Eventually, after fighting for some time with Sicily, Alcibiades, rather than returning to Athens for his trial at the appointed time, deserted. He ended up becoming a key advisor and strategist for none other than the Spartans. Even if he wasn’t the one who mutilated the Hermea, he’s still probably not the kind of guy you want leading your army into an expedition of such a size and importance of that of the one headed for Sicily. (He then deserted Sparta and returned to, yes, you guessed it, Athens. And (get this!) he was reinstated as a general! How’s that for democracy?) The fact that the popularity of Alcibiades, as well as the influence of his enemies who wanted more time to gather incriminating evidence, was capable of overruling law, a fairly serious, religious law at that, says to me that this “democracy” still had a long way to go.

In my next post, I will look into another incident from the expedition to Sicily that brings into question the democratic nature of Athens: Nicias’ fear of the Athenian public, therefore courts, and his subsequent unwillingness to surrender.

Saturday, December 9, 2006

Give Me Liberty, or Give Me Death: The Melian Dialogue

In a class I am currently taking we were, in our study of Thucydides’ History of the Peloponnesian Wars, the Melian Dialogue (V: 84-116). This debate, between representatives of Athens and the council of Melos, takes place in 416 BC, right in the meat of the war. Melos, a small island city-state, while known as being sympathetic to Sparta, claimed neutrality in the war. (Recent evidence has suggested that at least some Melians did, in fact, pay tribute to Sparta. That can be looked into more in-depth later.) Athens, eager to secure all islands as allies in their domination of the seas, sailed to the island to demand their tribute, whether through debate or force. This dialogue consists basically of the Melians trying to convince the Athenians to let them remain neutral and the Athenians, in turn, demanding the Melians pay tribute and become their ally

In discussing this in class, I was shocked to discover that the vast majority of students, when polled, would have surrendered to the Athenians rather than fight had they been in the Melian council. I am certain that most, if not all of the students, were influenced by the outcome of the actual historical events – the Melians resisted and were eventually defeated; all the men were killed, the women and children sold into slavery, and their city repopulated by Athenians. Nevertheless, where was these students’ sense of pride and honor? Their respect for national freedom, even in the face of an overwhelming enemy? Especially in this classroom situation, where there is nothing really at stake, how could you not vote in favor of freedom??

This debate, and the hubris of the Athenians, reminded me of another similar historical event, one with a very different outcome. The American Revolution. True, there are some major differences; the American’s had no Sparta to fall back on, nor were the Melians a colony of Athens. However, the core of the Melians’ and Americans’ conundrum is the same: do you surrender to foreign rule in order to avoid destruction, or do you take up arms, despite a horribly unequal battle, to sacrifice everything to save your independence? When debating this issue from the Melians’ perspective, the phrase that I came back to again and again was one from Patrick Henry, “Give me liberty, or give me death.” I agree with the Melians. They had no choice but to fight. If freedom is not worth fighting for, what is? Henry would have agreed; “Is life so dear, or peace so sweet, as to be purchased at the price of chains and slavery?” The Melians clearly did not think so. If the they had just handed over their city, an independent polis built up over 700 years, to the first oppressor that came by, they would have been undoing all the hard work of their predecessors. They would be selling freedom at far too low of a price. The Melians affirm this position, stating “we who are still free would show ourselves great coward and weaklings if we failed to face everything than comes rather than submit to slavery” (V:100).

It unnerves me that my peers, representative, I fear, of my generation, were so unwilling to send our imaginary Melians into battle in the name of freedom. Are we too comfortable today, confident that the freedoms we enjoy in America are permanent? Do we take these for granted? I hope not. Freedoms are never for certain and we must always willing to fight for them, regardless of the costs. Because, in answer to Patrick Henry, I say that a life bought by chains and slavery is not one worth living.

Tuesday, December 5, 2006

Why study history?

Disclaimer: This title almost makes me laugh; it is so huge. Entire books have been written on this topic. I anticipate that I will return to it in future posts. So let’s think of this one as merely the first installment. Let’s go.

I have always heard that history repeats itself, as I am sure all of you have. This seemed for a long time as though it may be something that was really just meant to scare us. A phrase used by middle school teachers to make sure that their pesky little students were paying attention in class. Because if we didn’t, history teachers silently implied, we were all going to become the next Lost Generation of some terrible war or fall victim to another similarly devastating catastrophe that could have been avoided had only we listened in 7th grade World History. As time went on, I began to agree, however, that the study of history has very important implications in today’s world and that having the background and vocabulary of historical inquiry is essential for fully understanding something as seemingly simple as what’s in the newspaper on any given day. How are you to understand the current political situation in Russia without knowing the socialist past and subsequent downfall of the USSR? What previous wars and international relations can we look to in order to better understand what is the best next move for the U.S. in the Middle East? World affairs are just too complicated today to attempt to understand without at least some basic understanding of the history uniting and dividing various countries and region. I guess there was a reason I always had to do those weekly “Current Events” presentations in history class.

I have never, however, heard these concerns presented as eloquently and urgently as Thucydides in his History of the Peloponnesian War. Thucydides opens Book I by assessing his reasons for writing, sources, and methodology. It is in this section that he states:

"It will be enough for me, however, if these words of mine are judged useful by those who want to understand clearly the events which happened and which (human nature being what it is) will, at some time or an other and in much the same ways, be repeated." (I: 22 – Penguin Classics translation)

This seems to me enough motivation for studying history. Had the North and South looked closely at the events of the Peloponnesian War, would they have been more willing to compromise rather than launching into the Civil War? Would the story of these two neighbors and sometimes-allies, members, at one point, of the same league of city-states, have affected the Union or the Confederacy leaders? There are many lessons to be learned from the Peloponnesian War – the best and worst ways to treat both allies and enemies and the wrong way to offer negotiations, among a great number of other things. Would world history be different had our leaders studied to a greater extent the events of the past? I suppose no one can say for sure. But I, for one, most definitely agree with Thucydides that they would be – and for the better.